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This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial finding — boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long run — generated a large body of work on the dynamics of simple adaptive strategies. In particular, a natural condition on dynamics was identified: uncoupledness, whereby decision-makers do not know each other's payoffs and utilities (so, while chosen actions may be observable, the motivations are not). This condition turns out to severely limit the equilibria that can be reached. Interestingly, there are connections to the behavioral and neurobiological sciences and also to computer science and engineering (e.g., via notions of “regret”). Simple Adaptive Strategies is self-contained and unified in its presentation. Together with the formal treatment of concepts, theorems, and proofs, significant space is devoted to informal explanations and illuminating examples. It may be used for advanced graduate courses — in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering — and for further research. Contents:Correlated Equilibria:Existence of Correlated Equilibria (Sergiu Hart and David Schmeidler)Regret Matching:A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)A Reinforcement Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)General Procedures Leading to Correlated Equilibria (Amotz Cahn)Uncoupled Dynamics:Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria (Yakov Babichenko)How Long to Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures (Sergiu Hart and Yishay Mansour)Dynamics and Equilibria:Adaptive Heuristics (Sergiu Hart)Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics (Sergiu Hart) Readership: Graduate students and researchers in game theory, economic theory, econometrics, computer science and engineering. Keywords:Game Theory;Dynamics;Equilibrium;Nash Equilibrium;Correlated Equilibrium;Adaptive Dynamics;Simple Strategies;Regret-Based Strategies;Uncoupled Dynamics;Bounded RationalityKey Features:Prominent authors (two world-leading game theorists)Significant cutting-edge body of researchNovel ideas and insights that are useful and applicable in many areasReviews: "A fundamental issue with any concept of equilibrium, including Nash and correlated equilibria, is to define the process by which equilibrium is attained. The work of Professors Hart and Mas-Colell has been the deepest in this area, especially in defining conditions (‘uncoupled dynamics’) which reflect naturally the information available in real economic interactions. Their body of results is essential to study of these fundamental problems."; Kenneth J Arrow Stanford University, USA "In social as well as physical systems, equilibrium is of fundamental importance. Reaching equilibrium is at least as important as being there. In the last quarter century, research that investigates how social or game-theoretic equilibrium is reached has been spearheaded bySergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. The most outstanding works in this area are gathered in the book before us — a must for anyone interested in this dynamic area of emerging economic research." Robert J Aumann Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel "The question of learning and convergence to equilibrium is of critical importance to the foundations and applications of game theory. But after half a century of research there are no universally accepted answers: different assumptions about players' information and learning dynamics lead to different conclusions. The Hart and Mas-Colell book describes fascinating directions of research on this subject developed by two distinguished authors and their collaborators over the last dozen years." Ehud Kalai Northwestern University, USA "In this collection two leading game theorists show that various forms of equilibrium can be learned by simple and natural learning strategies that put minimal demands on the players' knowledge and level of rationality. It represents a major contribution to one of the most important topics in modern game theory."; Peyton Young Oxford University, UK
Simple Adaptive Strategies by Sergiu Hart is 336 pages long, and a total of 86,016 words.
This makes it 113% the length of the average book. It also has 105% more words than the average book.
The average oral reading speed is 183 words per minute. This means it takes 7 hours and 50 minutes to read Simple Adaptive Strategies aloud.
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