It takes the average reader 3 hours and 1 minute to read The Constraining Power of International Security Institutions by Jeffrey M. Kaplow
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This dissertation examines how international security institutions affect the behavior of states. These institutions seem to defy existing theory: punishment is difficult and information hard to come by, yet security institutions often boast near-universal membership and seem to enjoy high levels of compliance. I argue that these institutions can effectively constrain state behavior because states use the membership and compliance decisions of others as important clues about the efficacy of an institution and about states' underlying policy preferences. I test my hypotheses using data on states' pursuit of nuclear weapons and their membership in the various international agreements that make up the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Chapter 1 summarizes my argument and the contribution of this work to the literature on international organizations and international security. Chapter 2 presents a new theory of compliance in which a state's decision to abide by an international commitment is driven by the track record of the institution---the institution's recent history of compliance. Using data on nuclear weapons programs between 1968 and 2010, my analysis shows that members of the nuclear nonproliferation regime are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons when there have been a greater number of recent violations of the regime. In Chapter 3, I argue that deeper security institutions may actually attract more members, because states will only join institutions when they have some reassurance that other member states will comply. I find that states are more likely to join the nuclear nonproliferation regime when various indicators---verification, enforcement, and compliance---indicate greater depth. Chapter 4 examines selective enforcement within international security institutions. I argue that enforcing states look to the policy preferences of violators when deciding whether to punish their transgressions. I use data on membership in the various agreements that make up the nuclear nonproliferation regime to derive a new measure of state preferences over nonproliferation policy issues, and show that a state's pattern of treaty memberships within the regime significantly affects the likelihood that the international community will pursue costly enforcement measures if the state seeks nuclear weapons.
The Constraining Power of International Security Institutions by Jeffrey M. Kaplow is 177 pages long, and a total of 45,489 words.
This makes it 60% the length of the average book. It also has 56% more words than the average book.
The average oral reading speed is 183 words per minute. This means it takes 4 hours and 8 minutes to read The Constraining Power of International Security Institutions aloud.
The Constraining Power of International Security Institutions is suitable for students ages 10 and up.
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